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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-3894 
________________ 
 
BEAVER RESOURCES CORPORATION, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM BRAWAND 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-08-cv-00215) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 23, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION*   
________________ 
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 
 The Beaver and Brawand families have been embroiled in a dispute over the 
ownership of oil and gas rights in western Pennsylvania for over two decades.  Long 
confined to state court, the dispute eventually found its way to federal court.  Although 
the action was scheduled for trial, the District Court ultimately dismissed the case for 
failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) based on the failure of 
plaintiff Beaver Resources Corporation (“Beaver Resources”) to obtain counsel after 
multiple requests.  On appeal, Beaver Resources largely disregards the procedural 
reasons for the dismissal, preferring to reargue the merits of the underlying dispute.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the case.1   
I. 
 The issues in this case date back to a lawsuit filed in 1988 before the Court of 
Common Pleas of Elk County, Pennsylvania.  In dispute was the ownership of oil and gas 
wells in Elk County. Various members of the Beaver family claimed that William 
Brawand had unlawfully extracted oil and gas from their land, and Brawand replied that 
he had a valid lease that permitted him to do so.  Beaver Resources, which now owns the 
land in question, filed a diversity action in the Western District of Pennsylvania in 2008. 
The case was initially assigned to Judge Sean J. McLaughlin.  
                                              
1 Beaver Resources filed approximately a dozen motions during the course of this appeal.  
The majority have been resolved, but Beaver Resources’ motion to strike dated March 6, 
2015 remains outstanding. That motion has no bearing on our disposition of this appeal 
and is therefore denied as moot. 
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 Albert H. Beaver, Jr. is the sole representative of Beaver Resources and the only 
person available to testify about the facts in this case.  The case was listed for trial in 
2011, but prior to the commencement of trial, Beaver Resources’ counsel withdrew due 
to disagreements with Beaver.  Beaver, who is also a practicing attorney, entered an 
appearance on behalf of the corporation, purporting to act as counsel.  The District Court 
held that Beaver could not act as counsel on behalf of his corporation because he was a 
material witness. See Pa. Rule Prof. Conduct 3.7(a) (“A lawyer shall not act as advocate 
at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness . . . .”).  Observing that a 
corporation may not proceed pro se in federal court, United States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 
566, 572 (3d Cir. 1996), the District Court directed Beaver Resources to secure other 
counsel immediately.  It failed to do so.  Several months later, after repeated reminders 
from the District Court went unheeded, the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.  
 A few weeks after the dismissal, attorney Timothy Biasiello entered his 
appearance on behalf of Beaver Resources.  The District Court reopened the case but 
awarded $1,644.85 in attorney’s fees to Brawand as a result of Beaver’s behavior.  The 
case was later reassigned to Judge Nora Barry Fischer.  After failed attempts by the 
parties to settle, Biasiello filed a motion to withdraw because of disagreements with 
Beaver.  The District Court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw without prejudice but 
ordered Beaver Resources to find new counsel within a month, by June 2014.  By this 
time, the state-court action had been dismissed for failure to prosecute.   
 In June 2014, Biasiello advised the Court that Beaver Resources had not obtained 
substitute counsel and requested that the Court extend the deadline.  Without Biasiello’s 
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knowledge, Beaver filed a series of motions seeking sanctions against Brawand.  In July 
2014, the Court issued an order reiterating that Beaver could not represent the corporation 
and indicating that any other motions filed by Beaver would be stricken from the record.  
Beaver Resources was given yet another chance to obtain new counsel, this time by 
August 2014.  Beaver subsequently filed motion for leave to appeal in violation of the 
Court’s July 2014 order.  By the August 2014 deadline, no attorney had entered an 
appearance on behalf of Beaver Resources.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b), the Court dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute and granted 
Biasiello’s motion to withdraw as counsel.   
II. 
 On appeal, Beaver focuses on the underlying property dispute and the District 
Court’s failure to grant his previous motions to strike an affirmative defense and for 
summary judgment.  We may not review these decisions.   
 An order dismissing a case for failure to prosecute is an appealable final order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Usually, interlocutory orders merge with the Court’s final 
judgment and are appealable as well.  See Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 
F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013).  This rule does not apply, however, when the final order 
involuntarily dismisses the case for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).  See Marshall 
v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 919 (3d Cir. 1974).  The purpose of this exception is to avoid the 
piecemeal litigation that would result if litigants who failed to prosecute were rewarded 
with the opportunity to appeal immediately the district court’s interlocutory decisions.  
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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See id.  Thus, we may review only the District Court’s exercise of discretion in 
dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. 
III. 
 In determining whether the Court abused its discretion in dismissing the case for 
failure to prosecute, we are guided by the factors articulated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).  These include “(1) the extent of the party’s 
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet 
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the 
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of 
sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) 
the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.”  Id. at 868 (emphases removed).  The 
District Court undertook a thorough review of these factors, and we will not reproduce its 
full analysis here.  Instead, we briefly explain our agreement with its conclusion that the 
factors favored dismissal.   
 First, Beaver was directly responsible for the dismissal of his corporation’s case.  
The failure to find a substitute attorney by the Court’s deadline—which was extended 
multiple times—was the direct result of his inaction.  Beaver has no one but himself to 
blame for his decision to disobey multiple court orders.   
 Second, Brawand was prejudiced by Beaver’s actions.  Prejudice takes many 
forms, including “‘the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ 
memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the 
opposing party.’” See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Adams 
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v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
Here, Beaver’s delays prolonged this case nearly three years.  As a result, it is likely that 
Brawand’s litigation costs were increased, and witnesses whose testimony at trial would 
have been valuable are now deceased.   
 Third, the record makes plain Beaver’s history of dilatoriness.  On a number of 
occasions, Beaver failed to comply with court orders to find new counsel and to respect 
the extensions of time the Court gave him.  In 2011, Judge McLaughlin gave Beaver 
nearly six months to obtain new counsel.  When Beaver did not comply, the case was 
dismissed.  After the case was reopened, counsel again moved to withdraw, and Judge 
Fischer gave Beaver several more months, including an extension of time, to obtain new 
counsel.  Beaver’s disregard of these orders prevented the parties’ dispute from being 
resolved in a speedy and efficient fashion.  
 Fourth, the record contains evidence of bad faith.  Willfulness and bad faith go 
beyond mere negligence and involve intentional or self-serving behavior.  See Briscoe, 
538 F.3d at 262.  Here, Beaver ignored multiple court orders and several extension 
periods given to him by two different judges to obtain new counsel.  Although the case 
was previously dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the state-court action was 
dismissed for the same reason, Beaver was given another chance to take his case to trial.  
His decision to flout the requirements for doing so, even after express warnings about the 
consequences, can only be regarded as willful.   
 Fifth, it is reasonable to conclude that no sanction other than dismissal would be 
effective.  Monetary sanctions appear to be insufficient, as the District Court’s award of 
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attorney’s fees to Brawand after the action was reopened did not deter Beaver from 
creating further delays.   
 Finally, it is not clear that Beaver would have prevailed if the action had 
proceeded.  The District Court noted that Brawand had advanced a statute of limitations 
defense with substantial merit and that there was no one to present Beaver Resources’ 
claims at trial.  A review of the parties’ briefs on the merits does not convince us that 
Beaver is on the brink of victory.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the case 
pursuant to Rule 41(b).   
 
